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THE OPERATIONS OF COMPANY I, 3RD BATTALION, 337TH
INFANTRY (85TH INFANTRY DIVISION) AT CASTELLONORATO,
ITALY, 11-15 MAY 1944, DURING THE BREACHING OF THE
GUSTAV LINE.

(ROME-ARNO CAMPAIGN)

(Personal Experience of a Platoon Leader)

Type of operation described: COMPANY IN THE ATTACK

Captain John M. Davies, III, Infantry
ADVANCED INFANTRY OFFICERS CLASS NO 2

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INTRODUCTION

This monograph covers the operations of Company I, 3rd Battalion, 337th Infantry, 85th US Infantry Division at Castellonorato, Italy, 11-15 May 1944, during the breaching of the Gustav Line at the outset of the final campaign for the capture of Rome, the capitol of Italy.

The operations described are significant in that they embrace the first commitment to attack action of the 85th US Infantry Division, one of the first draftee divisions to be employed in the European Theater. This division, along with the 88th US Infantry Division, also a draftee unit, received its true test by fire in this all-out, coordinated offensive action which shattered the winter line defenses set up by Field Marshal Kesselring, the German Commander in Italy. The attention of the Supreme Allied Commander in London and the American troops in England awaiting the signal for the invasion of the continent was focused on the Italian proving ground for these two US Infantry Divisions, both of which had been carefully trained over a period of two years for combat.

Activated at Camp Shelby, Mississippi, in May 1942, the 85th Infantry Division was a product of the United States Infantry training system. During its training and conditioning the Division had successively engaged in maneuvers in Louisiana, Desert Training in California, and Amphibious Training in the vicinity of Oran, North Africa. Finally, prior to leaving North Africa for Italy, the Division took part in realistic battle exercises in the Atlas Mountains (near Oran). The particular area selected for these final maneuvers closely approximated the rugged, mountainous terrain which was to be encountered in Italy. (1)

Shortly after arrival in Italy in March 1944, the Division was incorporated into the relatively quiet Garigliano sector of the winter line.

(1) Personal knowledge.

During the two week period prior to becoming an integral part of the front, the Division trained in the vicinity of Naples, well behind the lines, and later farther forward near Mondragone (See Map "A") where front line artillery activity could be seen and heard. Thus, the transition to combat even in the final stages was accomplished in the classic, gradual manner. (2)

THE GENERAL SITUATION

Having committed themselves to fighting in Italy, the Allies immediately met with stiff resistance. The slow tortuous advance up the Italian peninsula since invasion in September, 1943 finally bogged down to an actual stalemate because of three factors: weather, adverse terrain, and increasingly coordinated enemy resistance. By 15 January 1944 it was apparent that the Germans had established and intended to hold on a prepared line. (3)

In an effort to keep the situation fluid, the Allies made a flanking naval movement to the enemy rear at Anzio, but this was quickly contained. The main effort was then switched to the Cassino area. Repeated assaults here were costly and to no avail. A final, all-out, well planned effort on 15 March 1944 with bombardment aircraft support netted only slight gains in the Cassino sector. (4) As a result of this assault, the Allied Commander, General Alexander, began regrouping his forces for a deliberate spring offensive to be launched when the weather in particular was more favorable for Infantry-Tank operations and for the expected extension of supply lines incidental to a general push. (5)

The Gustav Line (See Map "A") flanked by the Tyrrhenian and Adriatic Seas lay across the rugged spine formed by the Appennine Mountain chain. Generally, it ran from the Tyrrhenian Sea along the Garigliano River, through the dominating Mt. Cassino Feature, and continued slightly north of the Sangro River to the Adriatic Coast. This line was intended to hold for the duration of the winter while additional fortified lines were being

(2) Personal knowledge; (3) A-1, p. 62; (4) A-4, p. 5; (5) A-4, p. 77

prepared to the north. (6)

At the time the fighting became deadlocked, Field Marshal Kesselring, commanding the stubborn enemy defense forces, had some twenty-two (22) divisions in Italy: nine (9) along the Gustav Line, five (5) containing the Beachhead at Anzio, four (4) in reserve near Rome, and the remainder in Northern Italy. (7) Opposing the Fifth Army in the narrow coastal sector were elements of two and one half divisions. (8)

The Allied forces composed of American, French, Polish, British and Canadian troops were disposed for the coordinated offensive with the Fifth Army on the left and the Eighth Army on the right (See Map "A"). The Fifth Army sector, specifically, ran south from the Liri River to the coast where the assaulting regiments of the 85th Infantry Division were located. (9)

In early April 1944, the Allied Commander, General Alexander, made his decision. Briefly, it was to make the main effort with the Eighth Army along the Liri Valley axis, while the Fifth Army was to push generally parallel along the coastal sector. (10) It is interesting to note here that shortly after the outset of the action it became apparent that the impetus of the attack in the US II Corps Sector was so great that the main effort was altered to take maximum advantage of the threat to the German right flank which had become unhinged on the coast. (11)

At Fifth Army level, the main punch was to be delivered in the right of the sector to expedite the Eighth Army assault along the Liri Valley axis. From left to right the Fifth Army dispositions were: 85th Infantry Division, 88th Infantry Division, and the French Expeditionary Corps. Initial objectives laid down by Fifth Army orders specified that: (1) The French Expeditionary Corps on the right was to drive for Mt. Majo (See Map "B"), (2) The 88th Infantry Division was to take S. Maria Infante (See Map "C"), and (3) The three regiments of the 85th Infantry Division along the coast were to undertake the following: The 339th

(6) A-1, Map 16; (7) A-1, p. 78; (8) A-6, p. 8; (9) A-1, Map 16; (10) A-1, p. 78; (11) A-6, p. 19.

Regiment was to take Mt. Scauri (See Map "B"), the 338th Regiment was to drive north along the west side of the Minturno-S. Maria Infante road to take S. Maria Infante in conjunction with the 351st Regiment of the 88th Infantry Division, and the 337th Regiment was to be held initially in reserve in rear of the 339th Regiment. (12)

Early in May 1944 the final preparations were intensified. Artillery pieces were moved up by night into camouflaged positions. Ammunition stock piles were set up. Movements by day in the Garigliano River Valley, under direct observation of the enemy ^{on the} held commanding ground, were screened by extensive use of smoke pots. Tanks were moved up and concentrated in defiladed areas. (13) Thus, all was in readiness for the concerted assault along the entire front with 11 May 1944 as D-Day and 2300 as H-Hour. (14)

PRE-OFFENSIVE PREPARATION

As previously mentioned, the 85th and 88th Infantry Divisions were put into the main Garigliano Line as a part of the regrouping for the spring offensive. On April 13, 1944, the 3rd Battalion, 337th Infantry (85th Division) relieved the 3rd Battalion, 351st Infantry (88th Infantry Division) on a ridge line east of Tufo (See Map "C"). Company "I" was placed in battalion reserve in a rear slope position with Companies "K" and "L" on line along the ridge top. (See Map "C"). (15).

During the period 13 April to 11 May 1944, the Battalion became accustomed to moderate incoming artillery fire and to front line activities in general. Vigorous reconnaissance and combat patrols of the enemy positions were conducted. On 2 May 1944 a combat patrol composed of members of Company "M" captured two Germans from the saddle between Hills S 104 and N 104. From the prisoners, who proved to be new additions to the 2nd Company, 94th Reconnaissance Battalion, it was revealed that a general strengthening effort was being carried out in their sector. To promote interest and desire to obtain the coveted Combat Infantrymans Badge, the regimental commander required that an enlisted man be a member

(12) A-6, p. 13-15; (13) A-5, p. 444; (14) A-1, p. 78; (15) A-3, p. 2.

of three patrols and that an officer lead three patrols in order to qualify for the award. Before the jump-off day of 11 May 1944, practically all men in the company had at least two patrols to their credit. Of incidental note is the fact that the first Purple Heart awarded in the Battalion was received by a man in Company "I" as a result of a slight wound sustained as a member of an ambush patrol. (16)

Being in reserve, Company "I" was given the task of outpostting S. Vito, a small group of houses located in a ravine leading into the town of Tufe. (See Map "C"). One reinforced rifle platoon stayed here and became inured to enemy mortar fire. Being under direct observation from Hill 104, which was an enemy salient forming a wedge into the Allied line, the men at S. Vito could not move by day and were therefore all drawn into the houses before dawn each day. By night all men moved out of the buildings to occupy prepared positions across the ravine. The Battalion S-2 used the position as a check point for outgoing and returning patrols. For the men who manned the fox holes in this forward position there was little relaxation at night and the natural tension caused them to be "trigger happy". Sgt. Gray, Machine Gun Section Leader, was tragically killed by fire from a BAR position at dawn one morning while repairing the wire line to Battalion which had been severed by enemy mortar fire.

Early in May 1944, the final shifting of units to their proper positions for the jump-off began. On the night of 6-7 May 1944, the 1st Battalion, 349th Infantry (88th Division) relieved the 3rd Battalion, 337th Infantry in position. The 3rd Battalion, 337th Infantry, less Companies "M" and "I", moved to a prepared assembly area forward of the Garigliano River Bridge (See Map "C"). Company "M" moved to an area near Tremensuoli (See Map "C"), where the company was attached to the 339th Infantry for the jump-off. Company "I" remained in the Battalion defense area attached to the 1st Battalion, 349th Infantry (88th Division) to patrol and to continue to outpost or screen the line. This

(16) Personal knowledge.

was a precaution taken so that the enemy would not know of the change in troop dispositions in case an aggressive enemy patrol captured some men in the area. As an additional mission, Company "I" reconnoitered for defensive positions in an area approximately five-hundred (500) yards southwest of Tufo. These positions were to be occupied in the event of an enemy penetration or counter-attack in the early stages of the jump-off; otherwise, Company "I", when relieved from attached ^{MENT TO THE} 1st Battalion, 349th Infantry (88th Division) would move to a position slightly south of Tremensuoli. (17)

On 11 May 1944, an inspiring message from the Fifth Army Commander was ordered to be read to all troops. In short the message stated that the time for attack was ripe and that everything favored its successful objective: to kill or capture the enemy. (18)

THE JUMP-OFF

Precisely at 112300B May 1944 the long awaited offensive began. Simultaneously along the entire line the polygot Allied troops began to move. In the Fifth Army sector it is well to point out again that the Army Commander was exerting his pressure on the right -- no thought of exploiting an advance along the coastal Highway No. 7 (the Ancient Appian Way) was in his mind. (19)

The massed artillery fire which opened up at this time had stockpiled large quantities of ammunition. To preserve surprise, the batteries had not been allowed to fire registrations and thus give away their presence. The firing batteries did not shoot a preparation, as such; rather, they concentrated on known gun emplacements, supply routes, known fortified localities, and fixed defenses. (20). It is of record that the US coordinated artillery support fired at this time was of the largest scale to date. (21). As the advance of the assaulting infantry was simultaneous with the opening of the artillery firing, the effect of surprise was complete. (22) The effect of the flashes of the firing artillery was

(17) Personal knowledge; (18) Personal knowledge; (19) A-6, p. 13;
(20) A-5, p. 444; (21) Personal knowledge; statement by Lt. Col. D. W. Hoffmeister, F.A.; (22) A-1, p. 78.

as if a full moon had suddenly been unveiled; whereas, the moon did not actually rise until 0100 hours 12 May 1944. (23)

As ordered, Company "I" screened the front of the 1st Battalion, 349th Infantry until H-Hour. The outpost line ran from S. Vito east to the Ausente River. Careful coordination with the 1st Battalion, 349th Infantry assured that the routes of their attacking troops would not conflict with those of the retiring screening force. By 2320 hours Company "I", outpost troops with the exception of the group at S. Vito, were back at the Company Command Post, but not without casualties. In returning through the old Company "L" defensive positions up the forward slope, one man was killed and two men were wounded by the now alerted planned defensive fires of the enemy. (24)

After evacuating the casualties, the company formed, minus the reinforced platoon outpost at S. Vito which was remaining in position to guide attacking tanks, and started the march to previously reconnoitered positions of Company "C", 1st Battalion, 339th Infantry (85th Division) which were located on the reverse slope of a ridge south of Tremensuoli (See Map "C"). The route for the movement (See Map "C") was along a road which paralleled the front line, south of Tufo and Minturno. Marching in column of twos, a column on each side of the road, the move was made without casualties despite the enemy counter battery artillery fire drawn by Fifth Army batteries just south of the highway. Friendly tank units using the same road were travelling blackout at fairly high speed causing excessive dust to be churned up. Not until daylight did the men of Company "I" discover that their OD uniforms were changed to a definite gray. Just prior to closing in the vacated Company "C", 1st Battalion, 339th Infantry positions, enemy prisoners captured in the first minutes of the attack by the 339th Infantry passed along the length of the company going to the rear at a dog-trot with hands on their helmets. Their apparent fright and amazed expressions drew ridicule from the men of the company and fired morale immensely. Well before daylight, 12 May 1944, the S. Vito (23) and (24) Personal knowledge.

group had arrived and the company was intact, now in reserve for the 339th Infantry which had participated in the initial assault at H-Hour. During the hours of darkness, enemy artillery was heavy; consequently, two men were wounded despite the cover afforded by the well constructed dugouts. (25)

With the daylight of 12 May 1944 the enemy artillery abated somewhat. This was probably influenced by the highly effective artillery liaison aircraft which were flying a constant schedule. At mid-morning the company was alerted for movement to Hill 113 (See Map "C") about nine-hundred (900) yards northwest of Tremensuoli. (26) Shortly after receiving this information the first casualty in the company due to a self-inflicted wound was evacuated. The move to Hill 113 was completed by noon and the men started digging in on the reverse slope. The route to Hill 113 along a ridge running north from Tremensuoli was noteworthy in that the debris of battle marking the way was excessive. Rifles, ammunition, gas masks, knapsacks, canteens and opened first aid containers were in great profusion. Undoubtedly, this had been the mainline of drift for many men wounded in the first hours of the offensive. (27)

The 12th and 13th May were spent on Hill 113 astride the main supply route for troop elements fighting on Hills 66 and 69 (See Map "C"). These two features changed hands several times during this period. Company "I", while in the relatively safe passive role of securing the ridge running back to Tremensuoli, witnessed compassionately the many walking wounded and litter cases who were streaming back to the Aid Stations in the comparatively safe buildings of Tremensuoli. Great bitterness was evidenced when it became known that the enemy was directing aimed small-arms fire at the "medics" who were doing a splendid job. Disregarding the danger of shell fragments, they were inspired to heroic efforts by reason of the fact that most of the wounded were men they had trained with over a two year period. Enemy artillery fire from the vicinity of Mt. Scauri was accurate and almost flanking. As a result of the intense

(25) Personal knowledge; (26) A-2, p. 82; (27) Personal knowledge.

pounding of the enemy artillery which was actually light as compared to the Allied artillery, two Company "I" men were killed in their fox holes not from direct hits but from the concussion of close rounds. For the first time the eerie terrifying sound of the German six-barreled mortar (nebelwerfer) known as the "screaming meemie" was heard. On the afternoon of the 13th of May the company observed the dive bombing of Minturno by two FW 190's which had broken through the Allied Fighter top cover. Meanwhile, Company "K" of the 3rd Battalion had been committed before dawn on 12 May to help hold Hill 69 against repeated counter-attacks. Fierce hand-to-hand fighting by Company "K" to retain Hill 69 gave need for replacements. On the night of 13 May, two (2) officers and one-hundred (100) men were sent out via Hill 113 to bolster the depleted forces on Hills 66 and 69. Intense enemy small-arms crossfire, artillery, and mine fields wrecked havoc with this group. Many never passed the stream Capo d' Acqua (See Map "C") which, being over waist deep, provided a terrific problem for the evacuation of litter cases. At one time German and American aid men worked practically side by side in evacuating their respective casualties from the mine fields which had been elaborately prepared during the winter months.

On the morning of 14 May, Lt. Stull, an extra officer assigned to Company "I" about a week before D-Day, was alerted to lead a contact patrol that night. His mission was to contact the 338th Infantry which had jumped off in the initial assault to the right of Tremensuoli. Later that morning the 3rd Battalion, less Company "K", was again alerted for a shift of position. Early that afternoon the 3rd Battalion, now relieved from attached 339th Infantry, moved out and marched to a position one-thousand (1000) yards northwest of Minturno (See Map "C" for route). On the way marching along the Minturno-Santa Maria Infante road, the Battalion was subjected to self-propelled artillery fire. One round struck in the Company "L" column and killed one man and wounded two others before the Battalion dispersed properly. In the new position (vicinity of Mt. Natale) the Battalion bedded down for the night on a forward slope. Intermittent

Artillery fire harassed the new position, but not nearly with the same intensity and accuracy as on Hill 113. (28)

Just before dawn the next day, 15 May, the contact patrol straggled in. Lt. Stull had been killed and three men wounded on the return trip, but, Sgt. Miller, the second in command, had taken charge and completed the mission. With daybreak most of the men of Company "I" sensed that commitment was near. At noon, 15 May, the Battalion, still less Company "K", marched to the vicinity of Hill 108 (See Map "C" for route). Being in the valley and therefore under direct observation by the enemy who still held the commanding ground, all men commenced digging in vigorously. The imposing heights of Mt. Castellonorato (310 meters) gave a strong clue as to the objective. Mt. Castellonorato, without doubt, dominated the immediate coastal sector. At 1430 hours the expectancy in Company "I" was confirmed by orders received by Battalion outlining a coordinated attack by the 3rd and 2nd Battalions, 337th Infantry abreast with the mission of capturing Mt. Castellonorato. Within the 3rd Battalion, Company "L" was to attack on the right and Company "I" on the left. Both companies were to attack with squads in open squad column formations, on a two platoon front. Company "I" was given Mt. Penitro (See Map "C") as an intermediate objective. Dive bombers and artillery were to soften both objectives prior to the jump-off time which was set at 1500 hours. Company "C", 756th Tank Battalion then at Le Grotte on Hill 108, was initially to give supporting fire and then to follow up the advancing infantry. (29).

THE COMPANY ATTACK OF CASTELLONORATO

At 1445 hours Capt. R. H. White, the Commanding Officer of Company "I", called for a meeting of his platoon leaders and issued his very brief attack order. The Third and First platoons were to lead the attack with the first platoon on the right maintaining visual contact with Company "L". The Second and Fourth Platoons were to follow in close support. The company, (28) and (29) Personal knowledge.

was to attack Mt. Penitro frontally across approximately one thousand (1000) yards of open terrain. On reaching the base of Mt. Penitro the Third followed by the Fourth Platoon was to proceed over the left slope while the First followed by the Second Platoon and Company Headquarters were to take the right slope. After the capture of Mt. Penitro the Company was to continue the attack and scale the heights of Mt. Castellon-rato. (30).

The attack moved out on schedule at 1500 hours with Company "I" in the prescribed formation, squads in open squad column formation. The formation was held while moving to the base of Mt. Penitro despite falling artillery and mortar shells. Approximately one hundred (100) yards east of R. ~~Cape D. Lopez~~ ^{S. Croce}, a narrow stream bed which passed in front of the objective, the sharp distinctive crack of small-arms fire could be heard by the assaulting troops. After passing the stream bed, the direction of movement of the two lead platoons diverged slightly so as to cover the respective assigned sectors. It was here that close and aggressive fighting took place to knock out the pillboxes and enemy positions on the forward slope. Meanwhile enemy artillery and mortar fire began to pound the position even before the results were clearly defined. However, the sheer force and aggressiveness of the attack carried the forward slope in approximately ten minutes. As the lead platoons cleared the ridge line, they observed and fired on groups of enemy soldiers who were retreating into the woods which ran halfway up the reverse slope. The lead platoons and the weapons platoon moved quickly down to the edge of the woods because the artillery fire on the rear slope had become more intense. At this time it was noted that the Second Platoon and Company Headquarters were not in evidence. The immediate and confusing problem now was the handling of prisoners who were surrendering in large groups. Here an argument arose between the three platoon leaders present as to whether or not to continue the attack immediately or to herd together the prisoners and to reorganize. Finally, after about fifteen minutes the attack

more detailed here

(30) Personal knowledge

continued, this time with the weapons platoon filling the decimated ranks of the First and Third Platoons. As the attack moved off the second time, now in a wooded area, the Company 60mm mortars fired in battery in the direction of the retreating enemy. The advance, now astride a path running due West (See Map "C") was halted after travelling one-hundred (100) yards by accurate small-arms fire probably from snipers who had the mission to delay the attack in the woods. Pvt. Bannis, a lead scout in the First Platoon, was killed in view of many of the men while engaging a camouflaged enemy rifleman in an exchange of several shots. Men who tried to advance further were stopped by rifle grenade fire from an unknown source. Light machine gun and automatic rifle put into the visible houses along the path was not very effective due to the restricted visibility. The men, now influenced by their experiences in the past hour and having lost the intoxication of the first few reckless moments of close action, were becoming unnerved and cautious: they were now convinced they were "pinned down". At this point, Lt. Campbell, platoon leader of the First Platoon, decided to go back and bring up some tanks. In twenty minutes he returned riding the lead tank of a column (platoon) of five. Despite a light mortar barrage which fell as the tanks appeared, the sight of the tanks so heartened the company that the attack once more forged ahead, this time with the tanks blasting everything along the path. The advance moved on another five-hundred (500) yards along the path until the lead tank threw a tread while negotiating a turn. This brought a halt, during which time Lt. P. B. Ray, the Second Platoon leader, arrived on the scene with only a few members of his platoon and the Company Headquarters group. In a hurried consultation with the other platoon leaders he revealed that his platoon and Company Headquarters had been severely hit by artillery fire on the forward slope of Mt. Penitro and that the Capt. White had been killed at that time. Lt. Col. Madsen, the Battalion Commander, had come up during the confusion wrought by the numerous casualties and had instructed Lt. Ray to take temporary command of Company I and to move forward to contact the leading platoons. It is interesting to note here that the strain of the action was shown by the evacuation of a rifleman for a self-

inflicted wound. The Company now started to move anew up a steep path (See Map "C") abandoning the tank platoon. Contact with Company "L" was established at this time and the move up the steep incline was a coordinated line of skirmishes. The advance was uncontested to the crest (234) where German communication wire to several observation posts was found. On arrival at the crest (234) south of the town of Castellonorato just before dusk, elements of the 2nd Battalion could be seen entering the town which was located in a separate peak (263). After physically contacting the 2nd Battalion, Companies "I" and "L" tied in a perimeter defense in the saddle about two-hundred (200) yards south of the town and dug in for the night. Wire was laid into the companies before midnight from the Battalion Command Post back in the valley and preparations were made toward continuing the attack in the morning (31).

As an indication of the severity of the fighting on Mt. Penitro, it was ascertained later that Company "I" had been credited with killing forty-four (44) and capturing one-hundred-eleven (111) German soldiers. From H-Hour to the capture of Mt. Castellonorato the company lost sixteen (16) dead and sixteen (16) wounded so severely that they never returned to duty. Several others were lightly wounded and returned to duty later in the drive on Rome (32).

ANALYSIS AND CRITICISM

Shortly after the taking of Castellonorato, the situation became definitely fluid. ^y ~~By~~ reference to the lines on 22 May and 28 May (See Map "A"), it can easily be seen that the break-through had been accomplished along Highway No. 7 in the coastal sector rather than along the Liri Valley axis through the Mt. Cassino area. Evidently, the driving force of the two fresh United States divisions (85th and 88th) in the coastal sector had not been fully appreciated by the Allied Commander.

(31) Personal knowledge

(32) A-2, p. 83.

From the company viewpoint, the successful aggressive attack of Castellonorato was the culmination of two years of training. This training was complemented by the ideal experience gained during the one month period on the static defensive line. Both of these factors gave Company "I" an advantage which was not always available to units in their initial commitment to combat action.

On the critical side, the verbal attack order given by Capt. R. H. White only fifteen minutes before jumping off did not allow enough time for the platoon leaders to brief their men or to make any reconnaissance. Also, at the time when it was imperative to press the attack and thus maintain contact with a retreating enemy, the handling and evacuation of prisoners was not accomplished in an expeditious manner.

The appearance of the Tank Platoon at the critical time when the spark of aggressiveness was nearly out, inspired a respect for the armored forces which continued throughout later action.

In summary, on consideration of the outcome of the action against severe resistance, Company "I" performed in a manner in keeping with the highest traditions of the United States Infantry.

LESSONS

Some lessons brought out by this operation were:

1. Orders should be issued to each successively lower unit with due consideration for the time element involved, so that the troops on the receiving end can be properly briefed and can make a hasty reconnaissance.
2. Troops should not be ordered to move on a road subjected to artillery fire unless a reasonable risk is necessary.
3. Tanks are a great morale factor for the Infantryman in the attack.
4. While there may be exceptions, a rifle company in its first attack action generally will be aggressive to the point of recklessness.
5. Conscious of our ample and seemingly inexhaustible supplies, troops are too careless and wasteful of personal equipment when committed to the attack.

6. It is essential that troops press the attack relentlessly, for once contact is broken the retreating enemy has time available to set up effective delaying forces to protect his further withdrawal.

7. A rifle company once fixed or pinned down by small-arms fire can soon expect enemy mortar fire.

8. The United States Infantry training methods, as such, proved to be sound.

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
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


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
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